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Abstract 
The emergence of a “second wave” of developing-country multinational enterprises (MNEs) in a variety of 
industries is one of the characterizing features of globalization. These new MNEs did not delay their 
internationalisation until they were large, as did most of their predecessors, and often become global as a result of 
direct firm-to-firm contracting. Many grow large as they internationalise; conversely, they internationalise in 
order to grow large. This is a striking pattern which, if confirmed, indicates that enterprises from developing 
countries have pursued distinctive approaches to internationalisation. It is a further interesting hypothesis to 
investigate to what extent such firms, born as suppliers of established incumbents, have leveraged on their 
“latecomer” status to accelerate their internationalisation.  
This paper documents how emerging MNEs may follow quite different patterns to reach, or at least approach, 
global competitiveness. In particular, it investigates how three latecomer MNEs pursued global growth through 
accelerated internationalisation combined with strategic and organizational innovation. Haier (China), Mabe 
(Mexico) and Arçelik (Turkey) emerged as Dragon Multinationals in the large home appliances (so-called “white 
goods”) industry. This is a producer-driven global value chain, characterized by mature technology and rapid 
delocalization to developing countries, where not only input costs are lower, but demand growth rates are higher – 
giving a decided latecomer advantage to these MNEs. 
Haier, Mabe and Arçelik leveraged their strategic partnership with established MNEs to upgrade their operations, 
evolving from the production of simple goods, into new product lines developed through their own design, 
branding and marketing capabilities. The recipe of their success has been the ability to treat global competition as 
an opportunity to build capabilities, move into more profitable industry segments, and adopt strategies that turn 
latecomer status into a source of competitive advantage. At the same time, their experiences show that there are 
many strategies and trajectories for going global. 
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ACCELERATED INTERNATIONALISATION BY EMERGING MULTINATIONALS: 
THE CASE OF THE WHITE GOODS SECTOR 
1. Introduction 
What are the “big questions” in International Business (IB) research? Buckley 
(2002) initiated a debate on this theme, when he claimed that the research agenda 
might be running out of steam. He suggested that the IB agenda had moved through 
three phases in the 20th century, concentrating on new developments observable in the 
world of international business itself. There was first a focus on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and its determinants; followed by a focus on Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) and their rationale and sources of advantage, and since the 1990s 
a third focus on globalization and its driving influences. Buckley and Ghauri (2004) 
elaborated on the third topic, suggesting that this might indeed constitute a “big 
question” that could guide future research. In this paper we take the arguments of 
Buckley and Ghauri further, and argue that one of the most interesting outcomes of 
globalization has been the rise of a “second wave” of MNEs from emerging 
economies, so-called emerging MNEs (EMNEs).  
Recent years have indeed seen the rise of a growing number of EMNEs in a 
variety of industries, from economies as diverse as Brazil, China, Korea, India, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Turkey. These firms are part of a 
“second wave” of developing-country MNEs, after the “first wave” documented by 
such scholars as Kumar and McLeod (1981), Wells (1983) and Lall (1983). Second-
wave MNEs appear to be driven directly by firm-to-firm contracting in a global 
setting – as would be expected in an epoch of multiplying global interfirm 
connections that offer more possibilities for firms (even quite small firms) to be drawn 
into the global economy. Their contemporary internationalisation (in terms of rising 
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ratios of sales, assets, and employment abroad) may be said to be one of the notable 
outcomes of globalization: just how EMNEs may utilize the multiple connections of 
the globalized economy to gain a distinctive advantage vis-à-vis incumbents, remains 
a topic to be explored in depth.  
What are therefore the factors explaining their success? To what extent is the 
experience of the still few companies from the developing world that have become 
MNEs useful (replicable) for other firms struggling to move up the value-added and 
technology ladder? Our study is designed to provide some answers to these questions. 
We focus on the EMNEs in the white goods industry – a mature industry where 
latecomer MNEs might be expected to be able to make their mark through initial 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) contracts leading to internationalisation via 
various kinds of partnerships.1 We document the rise of Mabe, Arçelik, and Haier 
(from Mexico, Turkey, and China, respectively), as successful examples of latecomer 
firms that managed to upgrade their operations, evolving from the production of 
simple goods, generally as OEM subcontractors, into new product lines developed 
through their own design, branding and marketing capabilities. One hypothesis to be 
explored is that these firms did not delay their internationalisation until they were 
large, as did most of their predecessor MNEs from North America, Europe or Japan. 
Instead, many of the enterprises from developing countries grow large as they 
internationalise; conversely, they internationalise in order to grow large. This is a 
striking pattern which, if confirmed, indicates that enterprises from developing 
countries, both those that are still small and those that are growing large, have pursued 
distinctive approaches to internationalisation. It is a further interesting hypothesis to 
investigate to what extent such firms have made use of the interconnected character of 
                                                 
1 “White goods” include washing machines, fridges, dishwashers, ovens, and cookers. Major household 
appliances used outside the kitchen, such as video and audio systems, are known as “brown goods”.  
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the globalizing economy in order to accelerate their internationalisation, through both 
acquisition and strategic alliances to acquire new brands, technological assets and 
other sources of competitive advantage that expand and diversify their competence 
base. In particular, and to the extent that most current internationalising firms from 
developing countries were born as suppliers of established incumbents, they may have 
used their arrival as “latecomers” on the global stage (Hobday 1995) to capture 
advantages associated with being late, such as the new possibilities for linkage and 
leverage of knowledge and market access available through globalization.2   
We first present the outlines of a framework for understanding EMNEs’ 
internationalisation process – as grounded in the extensive available literature on FDI 
and now-incumbent MNEs. We then sketch the main characteristics of the global 
white goods industry, to highlight how market, technology, and regulation dynamics 
may be opening up new opportunities for incumbents. A case study approach is used 
to shed light on the factors explaining the success of the three firms and link such 
features to the theoretical framework. We conclude with some digressions on the 
extent to which the experience of these firms is useful (replicable) for other firms 
struggling to move up the value-added and technology ladder. 
We see this study as merely one of many that will have to be conducted, on 
other industries and with other cases of EMNEs, before the main lines of a new “big 
question” in IB will be established. But we see these issues as so important, and 
shedding such interesting light on the wider questions of globalization and 
industrialization, that we offer the study in the hope that it will indeed spark more 
interest in this theme and generate a cumulative body of knowledge on the theme. 
                                                 
2 The “latecomer firm” is a resource-poor firm (both in terms of technology and market access) seeking 
some connections with the technological and business mainstream (Mathews 2002). For a latecomer 
perspective on internationalisation of Chinese firms, consistent with our usage, see Child and 
Rodrigues (2005). 
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2. Internationalisation by emergent MNEs 
While the conceptual and theoretical frameworks developed in the IB 
literature to account for outward FDI and the sustainability of MNEs are well 
established, the nature of the strategies that these latecomer MNEs have pursued, and 
their specificity compared to those developed earlier by now-incumbent MNEs, 
remains a relatively neglected topic (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000). The 
ownership/location/internalization theory is squarely based on the experiences of large, 
predominantly Anglo-American, successful international firms that can easily find the 
resources and the capabilities to expand internationally if they wish to do so. Dunning 
(1981; 1988) brought together the advantages that international firms drew from 
extending their operations abroad, in terms of three characteristics or sources. There 
was the potential advantage derived from extending their proprietary assets abroad, 
such as brands or proprietary technologies, bringing greater fire power to bear on their 
domestic competitors in host markets (the “ownership” advantage). There was the 
potential advantage of being able to integrate activities across sectors of the world 
with very different factor costs and resource costs (the “location” advantage). Finally 
there were the potential advantages derived from building economies of scale and 
scope through internalizing activities spread across borders that would otherwise be 
dispersed between numerous firms (the “internalization” advantage).  
As contrasted with the case of the so-called Uppsala school (Petersen and 
Pedersen 1995), the path of expansion is slow and incremental, with frequent loops of 
experimental learning. When they decide to invest overseas, the new breed of MNEs 
rarely have at hand resources such as proprietary technology, financial capital, brands, 
and experienced management. Moreover, for EMNEs the luxury of waiting does not 
seem to exist anymore as protection at home is eroded by market liberalization, time-
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to-market is reduced, and production runs must increase continuously to control 
costs.3 
Dunning and other adherents to the OLI framework have sought to adapt it to 
accommodate striking developments such as the rise of international mergers and 
acquisitions, the rise of international joint ventures and collaborative alliances, and 
not least the rise of fast expanding “newcomers” that appear to lack all the trappings 
traditionally associated with the MNE (Dunning 1995; Rugman and Verbeke 2004). 
Still, the striking feature of internationalisation by latecomer MNEs from emerging 
economies is that they do not have these OLI advantages to start with. They have to 
internationalise, in new conditions created by globalization, in order to capture the 
resources needed. They internationalise in order to build their advantages – a reversal 
of the traditional perspective. Thus the considerations that apply to international 
expansion in the pursuit of resources (and customers) not otherwise available can be 
expected to be quite different from those that apply to expansion which is designed to 
exploit existing resources.  
Utilizing a perspective that focuses on firms’ resources in an international 
setting (Peng 2001) we adopt an approach to internationalisation that views it as an 
increasing level of integration within the global economy. We also draw on recent 
studies, centred on the competence-based theory of the firm, which have argued that 
the nature of the competence creation process has changed. The emergence of 
international production networks has favoured a closer integration of the process of 
capability accumulation, so that the internationalisation strategy becomes heavily 
intertwined with technological and product diversification strategies (Cantwell and 
Piscitello, 1999). Analysing how EMNEs master this process can therefore also offer 
                                                 
3 As Haier's CEO noted, “Margins are low here. If we don’t go outside, we can’t survive,” quoted in 
“Haier's purpose”, The Economist, 18 March 2004. 
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interesting insights into the broader debate on the relationship between corporate 
diversification and internationalisation. 
One interesting facet of the internationalisation of EMNEs is in the way that 
they use and leverage various kinds of strategic and organizational innovations in 
order to establish a presence in industrial sectors already heavily populated with 
world-class competitors. In doing so, they benefit from a narrow window of 
opportunity available to them as latecomers. Firstly, they all internationalise very 
rapidly – so accelerated internationalisation is a distinctive feature that calls for 
analysis. Secondly, they have been able to achieve this accelerated internationalisation 
not through technological innovation, but through organizational innovations that are 
well adapted to the circumstances of the emergent global economy, providing 
linkages with incumbents in innovative ways. They have been able to implement these 
approaches through strategic innovations that enable them to exploit their latecomer 
and peripheral statuses to advantage (Mathews 2002; 2006). A closely related 
question is, of course, the sustainability of this process. 
 
Accelerated internationalisation 
In both advanced and emerging economies, accelerated internationalisation is 
a novel feature of the global business economy (Schrader et al. 2001). Latecomers in 
particular internationalise very rapidly, by making use of prior international 
connections, leveraging their own expansion through making use of these – as in the 
case of expanding abroad as contractor to an existing MNE, or being carried by a 
global customer into new markets (Andersen et al. 1997). It was as if these firms 
executed a “gestalt switch” from domestic to multinational (regional, and in very few 
cases, global) player – even if their actual pattern of internationalisation is incremental. 
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Thus they benefit from surprise in creating their global presence, equipped as they 
usually are with a ‘geocentric’ management perspective (Perlmutter 1969). A firm 
without this “gestalt switch” sees the international economy in terms of adding one 
foreign country to its domestic market, then another, and another in incremental 
expansion. In such a process, a “global perspective” emerges only slowly, if at all. 
Trade-offs between country operations, and the rotation of product strategies through 
the most relevant countries, are barely discernible as potential strategies.  
 
Organizational and strategic innovation 
Latecomers and newcomers can be expected to adopt a variety of global 
organizational forms, such as web-like integrated global operations. In most cases 
they dispense with conventional “international division”-style organization, which 
demonstrates that they begin their internationalisation already equipped with a global 
outlook. The effect is that such firms do not tend to suffer from well-known 
“subsidiary-headquarter” problems of morale and initiative (Andersson and Forsgren 
1996). The counterpart to this local responsiveness is the issue of maintaining global 
coherence and integration. Mathews (2006) documents one of many possible 
trajectories in building new organizational structures.  
As newcomers and latecomers, these firms had to find innovative ways to 
make space for themselves in markets that were already crowded with very capable 
firms. Viewed in their own terms, the firms found new ways to complement the 
strategies of the incumbents through offering contract services, licensing new 
technologies, and forming joint ventures and strategic alliances. It is plausible that 
newcomers and latecomers were able to win a place in the emergent global economy 
through the implementation of these complementary strategies – not on the basis of 
 8
their existing strengths, but of their capacity to leverage resources from the strengths 
of others.4  These internationalisation strategies, designed to enhance firms’ resource 
base rather than to exploit existing assets, represent a fundamental departure in 
thinking by firms about what “globalizing” means and how it can be accomplished. It 
takes the firms beyond earlier stages of multinational expansion, characterized by 
what Perlmutter (1969) described as ethnocentric and polycentric management 
attitudes, straight to a geocentric strategic perspective. This turns out to be an 
advantage of being a latecomer or newcomer. 
 
Branding 
Nowadays, virtually all consumer products sold by developed country retailers 
are made entirely or to a significant extent in offshore factories located in developing 
countries (Feenstra 1998; Gereffi and Sturgeon 2004). Yet, the development of global 
value chains assigned firms from developing countries a largely supporting-actor role. 
In the modular production network that characterize consumer durables and capital 
goods, in particular, lead firms concentrate on the creation, penetration, and defence 
of markets for end products — and increasingly the provision of services to go with 
them — while manufacturing capacity is shifted out-of-house to globally-operating 
turn-key suppliers (Sturgeon 2002). Becoming original design manufacturers (ODMs) 
and further progressing into original brand manufacturers (OBMs), either through the 
firm’s own efforts or through brand acquisitions from incumbents, is hence the most 
difficult phase for any latecomer or newcomer MNE. Manufacturing companies 
demand designers with strong creative skills who are capable of both identifying new 
ways in which people can interact with technology and strategies to design a creative 
                                                 
4 This strategy parallels a similar approach to leveraging technological capabilities by latecomers from 
incumbents, as described in Mathews and Cho (2000). 
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identity. Although a key challenge for companies from emerging economies, this 
aspect receives preciously little emphasis in the EMNE literature.  
 
3. The global white goods sector 
We focus on this industry for a number of different reasons. The white goods 
sector (SIC 363) shows common characteristics with other producer-driven global 
value chains, although relatively few scholars have analyzed it (e.g., Nichols and Cam 
2005, Paba 1986, Perona et al. 2001). Insofar as it is a mature and global industry, we 
would expect to see the emergence of EMNEs. Products are relatively similar and 
simple to produce, although assembling different parts and subsystems requires the 
combination of knowledge domains ranging from mechanics to electronics and plastic 
moulding (Sobrero and Roberts 2002). Although environmental and energy savings 
concerns, as well as the development of wireless technologies and connectivity, are 
pushing towards convergence with other technologies (domothics), the basic 
production technology is also mature (Granstand et al. 1992; Ferigotti and Figuereido 
2005).  There is therefore strong pressures to delocalize sourcing and assembly to 
developing countries where not only input costs are lower, but demand growth rates 
are higher as ownership of major home appliances is strongly correlated to economic 
development.  
A lesson emerging from leading white goods manufacturers is that success 
depends on firms’ internal resources as much as it does on the collective efficiency of 
the cluster in which they operate and are embedded (Sori 2005). In fact the choice of 
off-shoring location is driven not only be demand and costs considerations, but also 
by the presence of suppliers of specialized components. Outsourcing, once limited to 
neighbouring firms in the industrial cluster, has expanded geographically, thus 
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creating OEM opportunities for firms in emerging markets. Maytag dishwashers use 
Chinese motors and Mexican wiring and are assembled in the US. OEMs in 
developing countries are also producing on behalf of Western OBMs. The processing 
is now moving further as the world’s white goods – and not simply their components 
– are indeed increasingly being made in emerging markets. Electrolux, which at 
February 2005 had 27 of its 44 white goods factories in high-cost countries, will 
switch 13 or 14 of them to low-cost countries over the next four years. Premium brand 
Miele opened a Czech factory for horizontal-axis top loader washers for the French 
market. Whirlpool closed its Quebec plant, retrenched staff in Italy, and is moving 
much of its production from Arkansas to Mexico. Indesit is adding new capacity in 
Poland and Russia. The biggest Asian players are also building new plants in Central 
Europe and Russia.  
On the other hand, since household appliances are experience goods and 
reputation matters, brand loyalty is a very important competitive factor in this market 
(Paba 1986). It acts as an information-based barrier to entry, reduces the amplitude of 
short-run demand shifts and allows firms to experiment (brand reputation cannot be 
brushed away by a single product innovation failure). For some products, moreover, 
consumers are still willing to pay higher prices for goods produced in a specific 
country.  
A major recent change in the industry has been the simplification and 
standardization of production platforms that allow using standard engineering 
frameworks to which parts can be added or subtracted (Nichols and Cam 2005). The 
development of common platforms also allows to speed up product renewal and time 
to market, which are necessary to avoid price erosion. The introduction of computer 
aided manufacturing (CAM) and flexible techniques, including just-in-time, have 
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allowed to reduce production costs. These again are technological and organizational 
innovations of which latecomers, without the prior routines that drag down 
incumbents, can take advantage, and which help to drive their successful 
internationalisation. The search for greater efficiency, rather than pure price 
competition, had a dramatic impact on the plant organization of labor. Flexibility 
means that a production line can process different models without any special tooling 
up time or pauses in the production flow. It also implies the minimization of on-
process and finished products stocks. Producers and buyers order more frequently in 
smaller lots and expect to track their shipments so that they can synchronize deliveries 
with their own production schedules and with a minimum of warehousing. Again we 
would expect to see latecomers taking full advantage of such tendencies.  
Table 1 Competitive orientation of major manufacturers 
Global Players Whirlpool (U.S., 1906), AB Electrolux (Sweden, 1910), General Electric 
(U.S., 1907) 
Global Aspirants Bosch-Siemens (Germany, 1886), Haier (China, 1984), LG Electronics 
(Korea, 1958) 
Matsushita, Sharp, Toshiba, Hitachi (Japan), Samsung and Daewoo 
(Korea) in Asia 
Maytag (U.S., 1907) in North America 
Strong Regional Players  
Miele (Germany, 1927), Candy (Italy, 1945) and Indesit (Italy, 1958) in 
Western Europe 
Strong Local Players with Some 
Regional Presence 
Arçelik (Turkey, 1955), Mabe (Mexico, 1950), Multibras (Brazil, 1994), 
Fisher & Paykel (New Zealand, 1934) 
Domestic and Niche Players Sub Zero/Wolf (U.S., 1945), Guangdong Midea Group (China, 1980) 
Notes: in parenthesis the approximate year when the company entered into the household appliance industry. Sources: Hunger 
(2003) for the classification, Sori (2005) and company sources. 
 
At the corporate level, the world home appliances industry is still rather 
fragmented with no single manufacturer commanding more than 10 per cent of the 
world market. Fragmentation reflects the high incidence of transport costs, persistent 
differences in consumers’ preferences and brand loyalty. The world’s top ten 
manufacturers, ranked by sales, include three US companies, four Japanese ones, and 
one each from Sweden, Germany, and China (Table 1). Only a few offer the whole 
product range and are present in all key markets. In fact, only Whirlpool, General 
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Electric (GE), and AB Electrolux have a global orientation (UNCTAD 2005). Others 
have a strong regional position or are leaders in specific product niches (often of high 
quality). While they may not be present on all geographical markets, most 
manufacturers offer complete or nearly complete lines of major household appliances.  
 
4. Research methodology 
This study employs a case-study approach, in order to generate a depth of 
findings that would be unavailable initially in a larger quantitative study. The case 
study is “a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 534). The process of building theory from 
case studies is strikingly iterative. One of its strengths is its likelihood of generating 
novel theory, but this can also lead to weaknesses. The result can be theory which is 
very rich in detail, but lacks the simplicity of overall perspective and is narrow and 
idiosyncratic. Data was gathered from face-to-face interviews with Arçelik executives 
(Istanbul in December 2004 and Bucharest in May 2006), Mabe (Mexico City in 
August 2005), and three consulting firms working with the companies under 
examination (Milan in April 2005, Tokyo in July 2005 and Madrid in September 
2005). 5  The interviews consisted of open-ended questions gathering views and 
opinions, as well as factual data-gathering. Specific questions concerned the 
motivation and pattern of internationalisation, as well as the role of strategic partners 
and the competences acquired throughout the process. In addition to the primary data, 
supplementary data was collected from secondary sources such as other published 
case studies, company brochures, financial newspapers, trade magazines, and other 
media reports. In what follows we present the three cases in the order of their 
                                                 
5 In addition, UN-ECLAC kindly provided transcripts of MABE interviews conducted in August 2005. 
 13
globalization – from the slowest and longest established, to the most recent and most 
highly accelerated form of internationalisation. 
 
5. Mabe, Arçelik, Haier 
 
Mabe 
Mabe was founded in Mexico City by Basque immigrants in 1947 to make 
metal kitchen cabinets. Today it is one of the leading home appliances manufacturers 
in Central and Latin America, producing more than 12 million appliances per year, 
employing about 18,000 employees in 14 factories (ten of which are in Mexico, one in 
Colombia, one in Ecuador and two in Brazil) and selling products worth about US$2 
billion in 70 countries. The company ranks 146th in 2004 in terms of revenue amongst 
the top 500 Latin American companies and is ranked 66th in Mexico.6 
Anticipating the opening up of the Mexican economy, in 1987 Mabe signed a 
joint venture agreement with General Electric (GE). In exchange for a 48 per cent 
equity share, GE became Mabe’s main business partner and largest customer: it 
contributed the refrigerator component spun off from its joint venture with Grupo 
Industrial Saltillo, plus US$25 million in cash, and a commitment to provide 
management training and technological support (Vietorisz 1996). Pursuant to this 
joint venture agreement, GE licensed trademarks and patents, provided technology 
and technical advice and distributes Mabe’s OEM products in the US, while Mabe 
retained entire management responsibility. In 1987-88 Mabe rounded out its own 
major appliance lines (refrigerators and washing machines) by purchasing IEM 
Westinghouse from government and the entire capacity of the GE-Grupo Industrial 
                                                 
6 Data come from AmericaEconomia and Expansión, respectively  
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Saltillo. As a result of the joint venture, MABE and GE built a stove factory in San 
Luis de Potosí to serve the US market and an R&D Centre in Queretaro.  
Through the 1990s Mabe pursued an internationalisation strategy in Central 
and South America. Through a series of targeted acquisitions, it gradually established 
a production base to serve the Andean region. In 1993 Mabe acquired a Venezuelan 
manufacturer of washing machines and gas ranges (Menaca, subsidiary of Dutch 
CETECO) and a manufacturer of refrigerators in Colombia (Polarix). The deals were 
made on behalf of the investors on the Mexican side of the Mabe-GE joint venture, 
but with a Mabe management contract. In 1995 the expansion into Central and South 
America continued with the purchase of a ⅔ stake in Durex in Ecuador, of rights to 
the “Centrales” brand in Colombia, and with the establishment of distribution 
organizations in Guatemala and Costa Rica. With the aim of better integrating 
operations across Andean countries, Mabe regrouped its activities into Corporación 
Mabe Andina, which commands a 70 per cent share of the regional market. With 
technological and commercial support from GE, MABE replicated in these countries 
the strategy that led to the leadership at home. Local, well-known brands were kept 
and the product range completed by expanding production capacity to sell own brand 
appliances.  
NAFTA has driven the growth of Mabe, and of the Mexican home appliances 
sector, over the past decade. Following the collapse of the Mexican peso in December 
1994, Mabe, with strategic advice from GE, quickly accomplished a major 
substitution of imported components by Mexican-supplied components. Mexican 
exports of refrigerators jumped from less than US$100 million in 1994 to about 
US$230 million in 1999. By the early 2000s, more than one-third of all gas ranges and 
mini-refrigerators sold in the United States were being manufactured in Mabe plants 
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(Hunger 2003). Mabe and GE claim that their side-by-side refrigerators can be found 
in one every four American homes.7 
In 2003 Mabe entered Brazil by buying the CCE refrigerator business and 
gaining control over GE-DAKO, the joint-venture that GE set up in 1996 with a local 
stove manufacturer. In 2005, a further acquisition was made in Canada, of Camco, 
which is intended to increase Mabe’s production capacity in North American and 
enlarge product and brand range. With annual sales of Cn$643 million (US$550 
million) in 2004, Camco manufactures clothes dryers and dishwashers under OEM 
arrangements with various companies including GE, which was its largest shareholder.  
Table 2  Milestones for Grupo Mabe 
1945 Mabe founded; starts producing kitchen furniture in 1948 
1959 Mabe is Mexico’s leading exporter of kitchen appliances 
1986 Mabe-GE JV formed 
1989 Mabe expands production capacity and range (IEM and GE-Grupo Industrial Saltillo) 
1990 Mabe-GE opens new stove factory and its R&D Centre in Queretaro 
1991 Mabe-Ceteco JV to produce appliances in Venezuela, expanding in 1993 to Colombia (Polarix) 
1994 Mabe Sanyo Compressor established 
1995 Mabe expands into Brazil and Ecuador (Durex) 
1998 Mabe-Fagor JV formed to produce appliances in Argentina 
2003 Mabe acquires GE-DAKO in Brazil 
2005 Mabe acquires Camco in Canada 
In 12 years, since 1986, Mabe was producing through JVs in five external countries, all concentrated in South 
America, and it continued to build a strong presence in South and Central America, as a regional force. 
Brands: Mabe, Easy and IEM (Mexico); Regina (Venezuela); Durex (Ecuador); Inresa (Peru); Centrales 
(Colombia); Dako (Brazil); Patrick-Fagor (Argentina). 
 
 
Arçelik 
Arçelik was founded in 1955 by Vehbi Koç, founder of the eponymous group, 
to produce metal office furniture. It moved quickly into home appliances, 
manufacturing Turkey’s first washing machine in 1959 and first refrigerator in 1960. 
By the early 2000s it had seven production plants in Turkey to produce a complete 
range of home appliances. In 2005 Arçelik produced 7.9 million units and had sales of 
€3.1 billion, making it the leading firm in Turkey’s consumer durables (53 per cent of 
                                                 
7 GE transferred production of low-margin minibar fridges to China in 2000. Mabe also closed its 
washing machines plant in Monterrey in 2003 and moved production to San Luís Potosí. 
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domestic sales and 54 per cent of exports) (UNCTAD 2005b; company annual 
reports). Its 2005 international sales amounted to €1.2 billion.  
Koç Holdings, Turkey’s largest multinational, owns 57 per cent of Arçelik 
shares; another conglomerate, the Burla Group, controls 20%, and the remaining 23% 
are publicly traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange.8 
In the 1980s Arçelik started exporting on an opportunistic basis to 
neighbouring countries. As Turkey agreed a schedule of phased tariff reductions with 
the European Community in 1988, exporting gained in importance to counter the 
increase in imports and make the most of heavy sunk investments in new machinery 
and equipment. The firm licensed technology from GE and Bosch-Siemens that could 
be used for domestic production only. An OEM contract in the United States was 
secured with Sears Roebuck in 1988 to supply refrigerators under the Kenmore name, 
followed nine years later by a similar, but much larger, European deal with Whirlpool 
for dishwaters. As a condition of these deals, Arcelik committed not to sell similar 
products in Europe under own brands. In 1996, 50 per cent of washing machines’ 
exports and 30 per cent of refrigerators’ were under OEM contracts.  
To get around these contractual restrictions and support its internationalisation, 
Arçelik started investing in the development of its own technology and brand, as well 
as the acquisition of foreign ones. Significant investment in R&D in the 1990s led to 
the development of own appliance designs, often resulting in significant cost 
reduction with respect to the licensed technologies (Root and Quelch 1997). 
Following the reorganization of Holding appliance division between 1998 and 2001, 
the five existing firms were brought together to form Arçelik A.Ş. It was then decided 
                                                 
8 The holding is controlled by the Koç family; it is an industrial and financial conglomerate consisting 
of 106 companies, with total assets of US$14.2 billion, consolidated sales of US$16.2 billion, exports 
of US$5.7 billion, and 62 thousand employees in 2004 (UNCTAD 2005b). The Ramstore chain of 
supermarkets and retail outlets plays a key role in the group internationalisation strategy.  
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to export white goods and TV under the Beko brand, since this was already known in 
major European markets and according to brand managers it conveyed a more ‘high 
tech’ image.9 In light of the different market structure, Arçelik decided to develop as 
an OBM in the UK and in France, leveraging on the Beko name, while continuing to 
operate as an OEM in Germany. Sales offices were opened in all such markets in the 
second half of the 1990s.  
The 2000s saw the flowering of Arçelik’s internationalisation strategy, aimed 
at expanding brand portfolio, market penetration and product mix in Europe. A joint 
venture signed with LG of Korea in 1999, with financial support from the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank 
Group, led to the first air conditioner manufacturing facility in Turkey. Arçelik then 
bid for Brandt, a French company in receivership. Although it lost to ELCO, an Israeli 
competitor, building on the failure Arçelik made major purchases of brands in 2002 – 
Blomberg (a subsidiary of Brandt) in Germany, Elektra Bregenz and Tirolia in Austria, 
and Leisure (cookers) and Flavel (appliances and TV sets) in Britain. In Romania, 
Arcelik acquired the refrigerator producer Arctic, invested to modernize the 
company’s operations and expand the product range, and made the subsidiary the 
largest production site for cool appliances for the EU market. In 2004 Arçelik 
acquired the brand name Gründig, after the German firm went bankrupt (Beko 
Elektronik had been an OEM supplier to it previously), In June 2005 it launched the 
construction of a refrigerator and washing machine plant in Russia, which is expected 
to yield US$150 million revenues in 2007. The corporate investment program is partly 
supported by the IFC, which signed a €160 million loan. In 2006, it started exporting 
dishwashers to China and is considering whether to begin production there. 
                                                 
9 Beko Elektronik is one of Europe’s largest television OEM/OBM producers. The Beko brand was 
introduced in Turkey in 1956 and used for “brown goods”. 
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Over the last four years the company has doubled its turnover. By 2004, 
foreign sales represented 44 per cent of total turnover (up from 16 per cent in 1997), 
and approximately two thirds of sales corresponded to own-brand products 
(Arçelik 2004). Management has set for 2005 the ambitious goal to become the fifth-
largest European producers of white goods and pass the bar of € 3 billion turnover. 
The strategy is paying off in terms of larger market shares, especially in European 
countries, which make up 86 per cent of overall international sales.10 
Table 3   Arcelik milestones 
1955 Establishment of Arcelik 
1959 Production of first washing machine in Turkey 
1960 Production of first refrigerator in Turkey 
1988 Start of OEM exporting to US (Kenmore brand for Sears Roebuck) 
1991 Establishment of R&D Centre 
1997 Start of OEM exporting to Europe (Whirlpool) 
1998 Promotion of 6-sigma quality program and reorganisation of KH household appliances division 
1999 Arcelik-LG Klima JV established 
2000 Adoption of Beko brand for exports 
2001 Unsuccessful bid for French Brandt  
2002 Acquisitions in EU (Blomberg, Elektra Bregenz, Leisure and Flavel) 
2002 Romanian household appliance company Arctic acquired 
2005 New Chest freezer production line established at Arctic 
2006 New production line in Russia established 
Within five years of globalization initiated, in 2000 production established in six countries. Foreign sales 
account for 44% of total sales. Brands: Arcelik; Beko; Blomberg; Elektrabregenz; Arctic; Leisure; Flavel; 
Altus. 
 
Haier 
Founded (in its present form) in 1984 as the Qingdao Refrigerator Factory (the 
former name of the company) in Qingdao, a port city south of Beijing, Haier first 
business was the manufacture of refrigerators based on technology transferred from 
the Germany company Liebherr.11 Haier’s white goods sales have grown by 70 per 
                                                 
10 Arcelik/Beko holds a 7 per cent share of the European free-standing appliances market and 5 per cent 
of the OBM market. Beko products account for approximately ⅔ of Arçelik international sales and are 
among the top brands in many markets – including the UK (14 per cent share in refrigerators and 7 per 
cent share in washing machines) and Poland (5 per cent share). 
11 Other than a technology cooperation agreement, which ended in 2001, the connection with Liebherr 
ended in 1994. Published case studies of Haier include Liu and Li (2002), Muroi (2005) and Crouch 
and Rodrigues (2005). 
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cent a year on average over the past two decades to reach US$1.84 billion in 2004 (up 
from US$583 million in 2000).12 
Haier’s internationalisation strategy constitutes an example of carefully 
planned market- and asset-seeking growth through FDI. It initially focused on 
Southeast Asia, with investments in Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia to produce 
refrigerators and air conditioners (Liu and Li 2002). In 1999 Haier became the first 
Chinese company to operate a US manufacturing facility in Camden, South 
Carolina.13 From its US$15 million American headquarters in mid-town Manhattan – 
the 1924 landmark Greenwich Savings Bank Building – Haier also runs a design 
office, employing another 400 people. 
Haier also invested €80 million in Europe in 2001-04. It purchased the 
250,000 units per year refrigerator plant belonging to Meneghetti Equipment in Padua, 
also buying Meneghetti-produced built-in ovens and hobs to market them in China 
under the Haier brand name. Haier saw this acquisition as providing the opportunity 
to develop new products from a European manufacturing base. Also in Italy, Haier set 
up the European headquarter in Varese, at the heart of one of the country’s white 
goods district where Whirlpool and other international companies have large 
manufacturing facilities. Besides establishing itself in OECD markets, at an earlier 
stage and at a larger scale than either Mabe or Arçelik, Haier is also present in 
emerging markets, in Asia and elsewhere. In India, after a disappointing experience in 
a 30/70 per cent joint venture with tube maker Hotline, Haier already operates two 
                                                 
12 We use sales data from Fortune which refer to the 10 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, including Qingdao Haier Electronics Group and Qingdao Haier Refrigerator. The sales 
figures consist primarily of refrigerators and air conditioners, while televisions, personal computers, 
mobile phones and other products are excluded. The company is part of a larger diversified group, 
reporting sales in excess of US$12 billion and overseas sales of US$1.2 billion. Although these are 
often mentioned in the press, they are not certified. As other Chinese champions, Haier maintains a 
close relationship with public sector institutions (Wu and Chen 2001; Deng 2004). 
13 In 2006 a US$100 million plan was announced to expand the plant and add 800 jobs, bringing total 
workforce to 1,000 employees. 
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leased factories and five showrooms and is planning to open a new factory with a 
capacity for one million TV units and a R&D centre. In Africa, where Haier 
billboards are conspicuous in many cities, Haier operates SODINCO in Algeria and 
has allegedly opened plants in Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa.14 In 2005, following 
the establishment of Haier Middle East Trading Company (2001) and of an efficient 
distribution and after sales service network in the region, a factory was opened in 
Amman, Jordan, to produce both for the regional market and the EU. 
Table 4. Haier milestones 
1984 Founded as Qingdao General Refrigerator Factory under new CEO Zhang Ruimin 
1991 Haier is China’s leading refrigerator producer; Qingdao Refrigerator Factory merged with Qingdao Air 
Conditioner General Factory 
1992 Haier Industrial complex established, Qingdao 
1993 Haier begins to produce for foreign MNEs under OEM contracts. JV with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to 
produce air-conditioners in China. 
1995 JV in Indonesia with local producer of refrigerators and air conditioners 
1996 Haier starts manufacturing in Malaysia 
1997 JVs in the Philippines, with local company LKG, and Yugoslavia for manufacturing air conditioners; sales 
of own brand products launched in Germany 
1998 JV with Philips of the Netherlands  
1999 Establishes manufacturing facility in USA (Camden, North Carolina) 
2001 JVs in Pakistan and India (Bengal); Meneghetti acquisition in Italy; establishment of Haier Middle East 
Trading Company in Jordan (JV with Syrian and Lebanese partners) 
2002 Haier-Sanyo created in Japan; manufacturing JVs in Iran and Algeria  
2004 Haier recognized as one of world’s Top 100 brands (only one from China) 
2005  Industrial complex established in Jordan; plants opened in Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa  
From the beginning of its globalization, in 1995, Haier was active in more than five countries within five years 
(including USA). According to company sources, by 2005 it had has set up 10 industrial parks worldwide and 22 
plants overseas. 
 
 
Finally, Haier has tried to acquire the US third-largest producer of home 
appliances in June 2005, in collaboration with US private equity investors. Although 
the timing of the $1.28 billion bid for Maytag was partly imposed by external 
circumstances – the company was already in negotiations with other interested 
investors – it proved rather unfortunate to the extent that it coincided with the attempt 
by another Chinese company, CNOOC, to buy a US oil producer, Unocal. This deal, 
which did not materialize eventually in the face of strong political resistance, created 
                                                 
14 In June 2005, the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee 
invited politicians from nine African nations to visit the Qingdao offices. After their visit, they 
promised to become “volunteer spokespersons” for Haier in Africa.  
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an environment in which even the purchase of an American company in a mature and 
hardly high-tech sectors such as appliances was seen as worth the attention of security 
agencies. Maytag was eventually acquired by Whirlpool. 
 
6. General features of the cases 
How well do Mabe, Arcelik, and Haier fit into the framework of ‘second 
wave’ MNEs as discussed above? Pretty well indeed. Since the mid-1990s, these three 
companies have internationalised through exports, built their own resource 
capabilities, and rapidly expanded internationally through acquisitions of both brands 
and production operations, as well as greenfield investments. They have also 
benefited from the great dynamism of the domestic market, although in a context of 
trade liberalization and decreasing margins. They have succeeded in seizing 
opportunities available in the global economy to generate linkages with existing 
players, initially through OEM contracts, and built rapidly on them to establish their 
own brands and production facilities around the world.  
 
Accelerated internationalisation 
To varying degrees, the three firms under study have used participation in 
global value chains and OEM arrangements to overcome problems of market 
intelligence and uncertainty regarding the quality of knowledge potentially available. 
These linkages have provided initial involvement in the global economy.  
As noted in the milestones documented above, the earliest founded firm under 
study, Mabe, took the longest to establish itself internationally. Starting with the joint 
venture with General Electric in 1986, it took Mabe 12 years to expand to seven 
countries in Central and South America – but it has not expanded as yet beyond its 
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“natural market”. It is a good example of what Rugman and Verbeke (2001) and 
Rugman (2000) call “regional MNEs” as compared with global MNEs. 
Arçelik embarked on its globalization quest later than Mabe, beginning its 
OEM phase in 1988 and its full-blown globalization in 2002 with a series of targeted 
acquisitions and new openings in Europe and Russia to expand its geographical, 
product and brand range. In 2006 it operated two overseas production plants 
(Romania and Russia), a design centre in Italy and sold in 101 countries, increasing it 
share of foreign sales from 16 to 39 per cent (between 1999 and 2005), and being the 
third largest appliance company in Europe. The strategic target is to reach €6 billion 
total revenue by 2010, turn Beko into one of the Top 10 global brands in the sector, 
and control a 2 per cent market share. 
The last established firm, Haier has been the fastest to internationalise. It 
leapfrogged beyond OEM to internationalise through acquisitions and greenfield 
investments in all regions, starting in Asia in 1995, in the US in 1999 and in Europe in 
2001. Within five years of its internationalisation being launched, it was active in five 
countries (including the US); within ten years, it was actively producing in 22 
countries. 
 
Strategic and organizational innovation 
The critical starting point for the latecomer is that it is focused on the 
advantages that can be acquired externally. The three latecomer MNEs have all used 
resource leveraging innovative strategies to secure access to technologies that would 
otherwise have been unavailable. Mabe leveraged its knowledge of GE corporate 
culture to behave like a turnaround specialist at its South American subsidiaries, 
which in most cases it bought either from GE or from the founding family. Sanyo is 
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Mabe’s other strategic partner in the area of compressors. Another strategic joint 
venture was launched with Spanish Fagor in 1998 to enter the Argentinean market. 
Arçelik has license agreements with Bosch, Sanyo, GE, LG and compressor 
supplier Tecumesch. It forged a strategic partnership with Ubicom to develop ‘digital 
living’ smart appliances and use Internet processors and networking software that 
enables device-to-device communication. Its partnerships with European firms and 
exposure to more developed markets than Turkey’s, combined with a long-standing 
focus on skills training and engineering, led to leading-edge products such as 
refrigerators that won the European Energy+ Award for outstanding energy-efficient 
products. This is again a characteristic of latecomer MNEs that can leapfrog their 
slower incumbent rivals to read incipient market signals (in this case, the preference 
for greener appliances) and adopt leading-edge technologies. 
Haier too has leveraged on its strategic partners (Liebherr, Merloni, GK 
Design, Mitsubishi) and is entering into numerous parallel alliances in order to secure 
maximum leverage from advanced technologies. It is working with leading providers 
of wireless technologies (Helicomm, Ericsson, Metalink) and other appliance makers 
(Sanyo and Samsung) to co-develop home appliances with in-home wireless 
networking capability communications. In 2005 it inaugurated a joint power 
laboratory with ON Semiconductor (one of the world’s largest suppliers of power 
management devices) at its own R&D centre which will focus on providing a single, 
standardized AC mains input voltage platform that can equip all its next-generation 
products. 
All three firms have invested heavily in R&D and innovation. They all operate 
an R&D and design centre and have successfully introduced substantial process and 
product upgrading, as witnessed by numerous national and international awards 
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received over the last years and the number of registered patents.15 In April 2006, 
Haier became the first Chinese household appliance brand to win the prestigious iF 
Product Design Awards. R&D investments are also being made abroad. Haier has set 
up local product-development teams in Tokyo, Germany and the United States to 
differentiate its line and move up-market. Arçelik has opened a research centre in 
Italy to strengthen its relationships with Italian specialized suppliers. 
 
In terms of organizational capabilities, the three case firms adopted numerous 
innovations that have helped to accelerate their globalization. Arçelik, for example, 
because of the small size and limited capabilities of many local suppliers, displays a 
higher degree of vertical integration than might be typical in the appliance industry, 
manufacturing more of its components in-house. 16  Arçelik has also made the 
commitment to product quality and innovation a cornerstone of its expansion strategy. 
It has introduced a series of quality improvement programs such as Total Quality 
Management, tripling production with relatively low investment and the same factory 
floor layout and achieving good ratings from independent test institutes.17 Modern 
quality and human resource management practice have also been rapidly introduced at 
the Romanian affiliate, which was granted Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) 
certification in 2006. 
                                                 
15 The total number of registered patents as of May 2006 was: Arçelik (8 in US, 51 in Europe), Mabe (3 
in US), Haier (30 in US and 3 in Europe). Source: USPTO (http://www.uspto.gov/patft), and European 
Patent Office (www.ep.espacenet.com), accessed on 8 June 2006. 
16 The Çayırova plant houses a dedicated tool shop, staffed with 17 CAD/CAM design specialists and 
33 operators, serving all other plants, which also contributes to appliance designs. The product 
development department employs 70 engineers and technicians, some of whom came from Bloomberg 
(Appliance 2005). 
17 In 1992 management decided to approach Total Quality Management globally and systematically 
and do its first self-evaluation according to the Malcolm Baldridge model. Systematic total quality 
operations (6 Sigma) and three-year product guarantees were introduced in 1998, when Arçelik first 
qualified as a finalist in the National Quality Award. 
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Mabe too is utilizing the most advanced management techniques to boost its 
latecomer advantages. It characterizes itself as a “low profile, but pragmatic firm”, 
which implemented a “learning by doing” (“aprendizaje en acción”) strategy in 
searching and chasing opportunities for growth, through rapid organizational changes 
to better adapt to evolving market conditions. Instead of following an incremental 
pattern, moving from pure trading to distribution and finally to direct investment, 
Mabe decided to form a group of managers capable of identifying appropriate targets 
and then buying and managing them. Adoption of modern ICT and training of 
personnel is considered a priority and, according to company sources, each worker is 
entitled to at least three weeks of training per year. Senior management maintains that 
investment in human resource development is a key driver for rapid growth in foreign 
markets. In Mabe Andina, 5 per cent of working hours correspond to training and 
skills acquisition. Similar to Arçelik, Mabe has also invested heavily in after-sales 
service support as this is seen as a key determinant of purchasing decisions for low-
income groups. Mabe also contracted one of the leading US providers of dynamic 
value chain management solutions (i2 Technologies) to develop and implement its 
eBusiness strategy and optimize supply chain management from manufacturing to 
distribution, marketing, sales and delivery. Serviplus, the product service division, is 
expanding to provide after-sales support service to customers in all countries where 
Mabe products are sold (in the US after-sales support to customers is provided by GE).  
Likewise Haier has engaged in global consolidation of its operations, 
employing a strong and unifying geocentric perspective that has enabled it to capture 
advantages from its global reach and coordination, such as in logistics. The company 
had been a heavy and early user of ICT.  An Enterprise Informatization Development 
Plan was formulated in 1992, the enterprise Intranet and Extranet launched in 1997 
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and by 2000 all raw materials purchases were on the Internet. The personal imprinting 
of CEO Zhang Ruimin on Haier was a distinctive feature of the company’s early 
trajectory. His “militaristic” style of management is legendary: he once ordered the 
smashing of 76 faulty refrigerators with a sledgehammer – now preserved for its 
symbolism in the company’s museum. From that day, ‘quality supreme and sincerity 
forever’ became the company slogan and has become a core value on which the 
company’s new routines are formed. In the mid-1990s Zhang introduced the vision to 
turn Haier into one of the world’s top three home appliance manufacturers. To 
unleash the entrepreneurial energies of the workforce and compete on the basis of 
knowledge, he constructed so-called “accountability chains” from the market directly 
into those corporate services that typically never see the customer or feel the market 
forces, and has developed its "OEC management-control system"18. Starting in 2002, 
Haier has focused on making every employee a strategic business unit: each employee 
is an independent profit centre with the responsibility to make profit: (Lin, 2005). 
Haier has an extensive distribution and service network throughout China and uses 
this to gather data on customers. The company’s repairmen, for example, discovered 
that customers in rural areas used their washing machines not only to launder clothes, 
but to clean vegetables as well. The repairmen relayed this information to the product 
managers, who asked engineers to make tweaks to existing products, such as 
installing wider drain pipes that would not clog with vegetable peels. Haier then 
affixed large stickers on the modified washers, with instructions on how to wash 
vegetables safely using the machine. This innovation and others (including a washing 
machine optimized to make goats’ milk cheese) helped Haier to win market 
                                                 
18 In the acronym OEC, "O" stands for Overall; "E" for Everyone, Everything, and Everyday; "C" for 
Control and Clear (Lin, 2005). Every employee has to accomplish the target work every day with a 1% 
increase over what was done the previous day. Every Saturday, the best 80 managers are sent to 
training courses at Haier University, the company-run executive education arm for its managers, 
conducted either by CEO or President. 
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leadership in China’s rural provinces, while avoiding the cut-throat price wars that 
plagued the country’s appliance industry.19 
 
Building global brands 
As we argued before, the governance of the white goods industry presents 
opportunities and challenges to EMNEs. If mature technology, supply chain 
fragmentation and differences in the growth rates of domestic markets all sustain the 
internationalisation of developing country firms, they may still hard to acquire and/or 
develop brand reputation and consumers’ loyalty. Moreover, despite on-going M&As 
and consolidation, the big players have been in the business for more than 50 years 
(Table 1). Over this period they have built strong brands, acquired those of 
competitors, and established trust relationships with retailers. What is therefore 
interesting in the case studies is the strategic use that the three EMNEs have made of 
both acquisitions and linkages with global economy to build such hard-won reputation. 
This aspect receives preciously little emphasis in the literature on EMNEs. It is 
possible to identify three mechanisms. First, acquisitions of Western brands, such as 
was the case of Arcelik/Beko with Blomberg and Gründig (and would have been the 
case with Maytag had Haier managed to buy it). Such moves can probably work only 
when the buyers know how to manage a brand identity –Arçelik for example has 
consistently been ranked Turkey’s most widely known brand by AC Nielsen surveys, 
while Haier is the most valuable brand in China according to a Financial Times 2005 
special survey.  
                                                 
19 Haier’s approach to living with its customers has worked surprisingly well abroad, too. In the US, for 
example, product designers visited the rooms of students put to observe how the undergraduates used 
their refrigerators (Sull and Ruelas-Gossi 2004). They discovered that, in cramped dormitory rooms, 
students put boards across two refrigerators to create a make-shift desk. Haier responded by developing 
a model with a fold-out table, which enabled the coolers to double as desks. The new product was a hit. 
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Second, the three companies have supported this brand-building endeavour 
through long-term relationships with OECD-based specialists and the pairings seem to 
depend on the degree of psychic distance. In 2002 Arçelik adopted a new logo 
designed by the same American corporate graphic studio which had created the Koç 
Holding logo in 1987, and introduced the popular Çelik character, a technology 
spokesperson (Enberker and Ergin 2003). The objective was to signal the 
transformation of the company into a serious player in a global industry hitherto 
dominated by Western firms and in which Arçelik wished to compete on the basis of 
high technology and innovation, as opposed to low labour costs. In its quest to 
become Latin America’s predominant white goods company, Mabe turned to the 
Madrid office of Wolff Olins, now the independent Saffron (in which Wally Olins is a 
partner, along with Jacob Benbunan) in 1995. The goal was to express a fresher, 
stronger brand presence, both in the category and as a corporation. Saffron replaced 
Mabe’s muted red swoosh-mark, reminiscent of Samsung’s oval (but not as strong), 
with a confident, simpler logo it calls “congenial”. Beyond the logo, Saffron provided 
a visual system of bright Mexican colours, patterns and icons to create an appealing 
corporate personality “imbued with a bright sense of humour”. Mabe is now 
aggressively targeting the premium segment with new, more appealing products. 
Haier chose a Japanese firm, GK Design – over, for instance, an American one – 
because of cultural affinity, although interviews with the former suggests that the 
latter’s ambition to grow rapidly put strains on the relationship, as the haste may 
imperil attention to factors that GK Design considers important.20 
Third, at least two of the firms have chosen sports as the focus of its global 
marketing effort, a strategy that also characterizes other EMNEs such as Emirates, 
                                                 
20 Interview in Tokyo, 15 July 2005. 
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BenQ, or Lenovo. Haier entered in 2006 a marketing partnership with the US National 
Basketball Association and also sponsors soccer teams in Europe; as Turkey’s 
strongest volley team, Arçelik competes in the European Champions League Men 
sponsored by Indesit. EMNEs have enthusiastically endorsed this advertising strategy, 
which seems to be perceived as quicker and more effective channel in overcoming 
cultural barriers and adding a bit of passion to the company’s image, for at least three 
reasons. Sponsorship offers them a quick and easy way to raise brand awareness and 
enhance brand recall. Moreover, the exclusive partnership approach provided by 
sports governing bodies and other commercial partners confers upon them “image 
transfer” (i.e. acquiring the values of the commercial partners) and other benefits of 
association (e.g. access to distribution channels). Success in bidding for international 
sponsorship contracts can also signal competence, availability of resources and market 
power.21 
                                                 
21 Although prima facie sports sponsoring seems a high-return investment in terms of awareness raising, 
it is a complex and challenging undertaking, often undermined by weaknesses and failures and the 
impact of which is only likely to be optimal when it is used in conjunction with other marketing 
communications (Chadwick and Thwaites 2005). Still, sports sponsoring is a form of leap-frogging 
insofar as it has certain ‘propulsive properties’ that enables companies to generate instant attention. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper has presented the experience of three latecomer firms which have 
established themselves as key regional players, in one case with global ambitions. As 
in the successful cases documented by Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000), the recipe of their 
success has been the ability to treat global competition as an opportunity to build 
capabilities, move into more profitable industry segments, and adopt strategies that 
turn latecomer status into a source of competitive advantage. Internationalising firms 
from developing countries are pursuing strategies that enable them to catch-up with 
established players, through leveraging off their latecomer advantages and strategic 
partnerships with market leaders. As competition intensifies and raw material prices 
go up, OEM white goods producers see their profit margins squeezed and cannot rely 
anymore on price-cutting and fast-paced expansion.  This puts additional pressure to 
create new sources of competitive advantage, through investments in innovation, 
industrial design and branding, and acquisition of technology and brands overseas. 
Two of the EMNEs considered have established R&D or design centres in more 
advanced economies – although some are simply ‘listening posts’ – to benefit from 
the cutting-edge knowledge. 
To what extent are these experiences completely new? Although the 
experience of Italian producers in the 1980s as emergent MNEs suggests that history 
is repeating itself (Sori 2005; Cam and Sugur 2005), there are differences in terms of 
speed.  
• Arçelik has remained relatively focused on white goods, despite leveraging 
the membership in Turkey’s largest diversified conglomerate. Its internationalisation 
strategy has been two pronged – buying established brands in “old” Europe and 
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adding manufacturing capacity in “new” Europe. It has also invested heavily in 
manufacturing, organizational excellence, R&D, innovation and quality.  
• Haier has built up an impressive variety of product lines and varieties, a 
choice that can be explained by the fact that China remains a poor country with weak 
infrastructures and institutions. Vertical integration is therefore an apt strategy to 
offset the lack of some key markets and associated sunk costs can be better recovered 
by expanding product range. Although Haier has started investing overseas at an early 
corporate age, it still relies heavily on foreign components and technology.  
• Mabe has made the most of geographical and “psychic” contiguity with the 
United States, partnering with one of its most celebrated enterprises, General Electric, 
and building in the process the necessary skills to expand at a later stage beyond the 
Mexico market and into South America. The key issue here is scale and capacity to 
rapidly develop new products as demand starts to grow and become more 
differentiated. Mabe has been able to interpret the Latin American gusto, while at the 
same time producing stoves to US taste. 
The more the world economy becomes interconnected, the greater the 
pressures on firms to internationalise. Today firms internationalise in order to enhance 
their competitiveness, such as through attracting global customers. The insights 
generated are suggestive of trends that make it more plausible to argue that 
globalization is being driven not just by the giant incumbent firms (Nolan et al. 2002) 
but also by emerging firms internationalising from the periphery which capture 
competitive space from incumbents because of their ability to exploit the linkages 
available through globalization and developing a culture of continual cross-border 
learning and value-addition (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000). The giants are still very 
much tied to a “home base” and to date have demonstrated little appetite for engaging 
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in truly “global” competition. By contrast, newcomers and latecomers – the MNEs 
from the developing world – are more likely to be global in their outlook and their 
strategy and organization. This is giving them rapidly acquired advantages over 
slower-moving and less-focused incumbents – even in markets that have traditionally 
been viewed as “global”.  
What are the implications for other OEM firms which aim to upgrade to OBM 
status? What lessons can be learned? If firms from emerging, transition, and 
developing economies are to grow and enhance their profitability, they will need to 
vie for the role of first-tier suppliers for lead firms, to operate on a global scale, and, 
in certain instances, to co-locate plants near the facilities of lead assemblers. 
Developing research and original design capability can further strengthen 
competitiveness, enable firms to take responsibility for entire modules, and eventually 
make a transition to OBM on a regional or global scale. The major risks are related to 
overstretching, both geographically and functionally, especially in view of the well-
documented difficulties that Japanese and Korean investors have had in the past in 
operating multi-country production operations (e.g., Encarnation 1999 and Sachwald 
2002).22  
If the story we tell is accurate, is it also replicable? The white goods sector is a 
mature industry. Although OECD-based MNEs retain the lead in production and 
innovation activities, countries and firms from the periphery are increasingly involved 
in production of appliances, and not merely of their components. Moreover, demand 
growth is much higher in emerging markets than in industrialized countries. Leaders 
                                                 
22 Industrial relations seem to be another area where cultural differences can become a barrier for 
latecomer MNEs in more advanced countries. Arçelik lost its bid for Brandt mainly because its 
industrial plan envisaged a larger scale retrenchment than its rival. At Haier, humiliation and ritual 
embarrassment grew to a company tradition and technique to boost productivity that managers could 
not transplant to foreign factories in US and Italy. 
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in the white goods industry have prospered by achieving economies of scale, better 
control of distribution channels and rather simple innovation. Facing declining prices, 
they are re-strategizing, investing heavily in R&D and innovation.23 Still, in other 
markets that have traditionally been domestic-oriented, like steel and cement, the 
peripheral firms are demonstrating how advantages can be secured through globalized 
operations and service. 
As EMNEs now start to invest in other developing countries, the impact of 
their behaviours on the host economies becomes by itself worth of additional research. 
What upwards and downwards linkages do they establish? How effective are they 
proving as instigators of changes? Is there any notable difference in their behaviours 
compared to those of traditional OECD MNEs that can back the claim that South-
South investment is “development-friendly”? What are the implications for domestic 
firms in the home country, in terms of adoption of best practice technology and 
organisation structure? These are interesting, though under researched questions, 
which we trust will be explored future research by other scholars as well as by 
ourselves – all contributing to making the emergence of latecomer MNEs one of the 
challenging “big questions” for IB research. 
 
                                                 
23 Whirlpool is a case in point (“Creativity Overflowing”, Business Week, 8 May 2006). 
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